Thompson Sells Out Wisconsin's Resources to Mining Interests, cont.

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1954  ---   Mining companies explore Northern Wisconsin by helicopter.
1970  ---   Kennecott announces Ladysmith deposit.
1974  ---   State passes first mining reclamation law.
1976  ---   Exxon discovers Crandon deposit.
1976  ---   DNR hearing on EIS for Ladysmith; only Kennecott lawyer allowed to question.  EIS ruled adequate.
1976  ---   Exxon announces Crandon deposit.
1977  ---   Public Intervenor challenges Kennecott permit.  Permit is dismissed.
1977-78 --- First comprehensive mining law passed.
1981  ---   Exxon files Notice of Intent.
1981  ---   Wisconsin eliminates non-degradation surface water quality standards.
1983  ---   Mining exempted from groundwater standards.
1983  ---   Mining industry gets exemption from foreign corporation land ownership cap.
1986  ---   Tommy Thompson elected Governor.
Nov. 1986 ---  DNR releases final EIS for Crandon Mine and prepares for master hearing.
Dec. 1986 ---  Exxon withdraws its permit application, citing poor metal prices.
1987  ---   James Klauser, Exxon lobbyist, appointed Secretary of the Dept. of Administration.
1987  ---   Kennecott announces plans for gold and copper mine at Ladysmith.
1987  ---   Local Agreement Law is passed as amendment to state budget.
1988  ---   State law overrides local mining ordinances.
1989  ---   State removes restrictions on trucks hauling ore.
1990  ---   Thompson re-elected to second term.
1990  ---   Legislature passes mining ban on State-owned lands. It is vetoed by Thompson. It is passed again and again it is vetoed.
1991  ---   Flambeau mine receives required permits.
1992  ---   Flambeau Mine begins operation.
1993  ---   Exxon returns first with Phelps Dodge then with Rio Algom as Crandon Mining Company (CMC)
1994  ---   Thompson re-elected to third term.
June 1994  --- Exxon/Rio Algom submit mine application
Dec. 1994  --- DNR issues decision that it does not have the authority to ban sulfide mining.
Jan. 1995 --- Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce (WMC) hired by CMC.
March 1995  --- State passes "bad actor" law, but allows DNR to grant waivers for environmental felons.
1995  ---  Governor's budget eliminates Public Intervenor and makes DNR Secretary Governor-appointed
May 1995  --- CMC submits its environmental impact report and first of many variations on its permit application and technical studies.
Sept. 1995  ---  Judge Henderson rules DNR does have authority to ban sulfide mining.
Dec. 1995 ---  Mining Moratorium bill introduced but buried in committee.
May 1996 ---  Nashville Zoning Board denies BHP exploration permit. BHP initiates suit against Nashville Town Board members.  Board of  Adjustment grants BHP an exploration permit.
June 1996  --- State appeals Henderson decision; DNR does not have authority to ban sulfide mining.
Oct. 1996  ---  ECCOLA publishes "Questions of Bias"documenting historic DNR pro-mining bias.
Dec. 7, 1996  --- Special town meeting of Nashville citizens on local agreement is immediately shut down by town board.
Dec. 12, 1996  ---  CMC signs local agreements with Nashville and Forest County.
Dec.  1996  ---  Republican majority dismisses legislature  a week early and avoids addressing Mining Moratorium Bill.
Feb. 1997 ---  Flambeau mine ceases operation.
Feb. 1997 --- "Environmentally Responsible" Mining Conference chaired by former Democratic Gov. Earl.
March 1997 ---  Metallic Mining Council reactivated with pro-mining majority.
March 11, 1997 --- Senate passes Mining Moratorium Bill (SB3) by a vote of 29-3.
April 14, 1997 --- Conservation Congress members overwhelmingly vote in support of the Mining Moratorium Bill.
April 1997  --- Nashville residents vote pro-mining Town Board members out of office.
July 1997  --- Earth First! peacefully protests Crandon Mine: 29 EF! protestors arrested; Numerous violations of civil rights charged by ACLU.
Dec. 1997  --- DNR revises mining water quality code but maintains 1,200-foot compliance zone and does not require mandatory remediation.
Jan. 1998  --- DNR publishes "Misconceptions About Mining in Wisconsin," attacking 25 positions of the environmental community with no attempt to question positions put forth by mining supporters.
Jan. 1998  --- Flambeau Mining changes their reclamation plan for the Ladysmith mine with full approval of the DNR and no public input.
Jan. 1998  --- Rio Algom announces it is buying Exxon out of  Crandon Mine project.  Local company name changed to Nicolet Minerals Company (NMC).
Jan. 22, 1998   --- State Assembly adds gutting amendment to the Mining Moratorium Bill.
Jan. 28, 1998  --- Michigan's Gov. Engler challenges the  diversion of tributary groundwater from the Great Lakes basin. Thompson says he "always had trouble with that."
Feb. 3, 1998  --- Senate restores meaningful definition to Mining Moratorium Bill.
Feb. 4, 1998  --- Moratorium Bill overwhelmingly passes in the Assembly.
March 1998  --- Nicolet Minerals proposes to study alternatives to Wisconsin River pipeline.
April 13, 1998  --- Conservation Congress overwhelmingly supports returning the appointment of the DNR  Secretary to the Natural Resources Board.
April 22, 1998  --- Thompson signs the Mining Moratorium Bill into law and claims credit.
June 30, 1998  ---  DNR requests NMC to revise eight of  its documents and provide example mines for Moratorium Law compliance but gives no specific deadlines.
Sept. 23, 1998  --- Nashville Town Board rescinds 1996 local agreement.
Oct. 2, 1998  --- George Meyer refuses to enforce the Mining Moratorium Law as intended by its legislative authors.
 
Issues

James Klauser

One of Thompson's first appointments after being elected Governor was James Klauser, a paid lobbyist for Exxon Corp., to the highest cabinet position in the state, Secretary of the Dept. of Administration.  Back in 1981 Klauser told the leaders of Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce (WMC) that "Wisconsin could host up to ten metal mines by 2000."  As Thompson's right hand man, for ten years Klauser attempted to fulfill this dream by masterminding the concentration of power within his department, leading the effort to weaken local control over development issues, and paving the way for his former employers to exploit Wisconsin's mineral resources.

Immediately upon his resignation from that post in 1996, Klauser returned to his previous legal firm, Dewitt, Ross & Stevens, which was representing WMC in a suit against the Environmental Protection Agency  (EPA) for granting the Indian tribes authority to set water and air quality standards within their reservations. Such authority granted under hundred year-old treaties was seen by the DNR as a challenge to their own authority and a deterrent to the proposed Crandon Mine.

Tribal Gaming Compacts

Since the people of Wisconsin passed a constitutional amendment allowing gambling in the state, federal law has required the Thompson Administration to negotiate in good faith with the Indian Tribes on gaming compacts. Such negotiations are required by law to be limited solely to issues directly related to the gaming issues.  Despite this restriction, as many of the tribes' compacts came up for review and renewal, the Thompson Administration repeatedly and persistently pushed for compromise on tribal treaty rights including the right to establish groundwater and air quality standards on their reservations.

James Buchen, Vice-President of Government Relations of WMC, led the charge with the declaration that "Implementation of certain federal Clean Water Act provisions affecting the Native American Tribes, could be the most controversial and contentious environmental development affecting the state in decades,"(4) and both Thompson and Meyer echoed these sentiments.

Less than six weeks after EPA granted the Mole Lake Sakaogon authority over their waters, Meyer and Thompson requested that Attorney General Doyle appeal the decision.(5)

Despite continued coverage in the media of the stalemates in the gaming compact negotiations over environmental issues,(6) Mark Bugher, secretary of the state Department of Administration, tried to discount the issue by saying, "I don't recall that was a huge issue. It may have come up in passing."(7)

Tribal leaders, on the other hand, saw this intervention as a substantial roadblock and have reported that the need to achieve favorable gaming compacts in a timely manner has, of necessity, restricted their active participation in the debate on mining issues.(8)

Great Lakes Diversion

Exxon and Rio Algom first proposed dumping the wastewater from their proposed Crandon mine into the headwaters of the Wolf River.  When it became obvious that it would be too expensive to meet the stringent water -quality standards under "Outstanding Resource Water" requirements, they proposed building a 38-mile pipeline to the Wisconsin River.

This put Wisconsin at odds with our Great Lakes neighbors who had agreed in the mid-80's under the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) that there should be no diversion of Great Lake's waters out of the basin. Thompson's DNR was the first to support the mining company's attempt to transfer water from the basin, using a weak and legalist interpretation of the WRDA that claims that there is no connection between groundwater and surface waters.

When a coalition of Wisconsin conservation and environmental groups challenged the Army Corps of Engineers in federal courts for backing the Wisconsin DNR position, the Thompson Administration was willing to actively defend this action in the courts for the benefit of the mining company.

Only after New York's Dept. of Environmental Conservation, Michigan's Republican Gov. Engler, and  a large bipartisan delegation of Great Lakes legislators challenged the legality of this diversion that the Thompson administration and the DNR declared that they had some technical questions about the pipeline and asked the mining company to seek alternative strategies for dealing with the waste.

Because the Wisconsin River pipeline was then, and still is a part of Nicolet Minerals' proposal, and due to important legal ramifications related to interbasin diversions, a coalition of Wisconsin conservation and environmental groups filed suit in Federal court in June, 1998 to challenge the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' decision to approve the proposed withdrawal.

DNR Budget Cuts

Thompson has severely cut the budget of his DNR at the expense of environmental protection. In order to work within the Governor's budget cuts, the DNR removed pollution monitors that gave DNR staff long term scientific background data for the Upper Wisconsin River. Oxygen monitors and flow gauges were disconnected in the Spring of 1995.  Coincidentally in the Spring of 1995, Crandon Mining Company announced they would use that same part of the river to dump their polluted waste water from their mine 38 miles away.

In 1977, the EPA insisted that the DNR review the same portion of the Wisconsin River because the state has been violating pollution standards for oxygen demand. The DNR formed a select committee to "reallocate" the oxygen loads and included a mining company representative even though the company claimed they will have "undetectable" oxygen demands in their polluted wastewater. The reallocation process is 15 years behind schedule because of budget cuts to the DNR.

Fast Track Permitting Costs

Noranda Minerals of Toronto discovered an ore body in 1989 in Oneida County.  The DNR held a Notice of Intent meeting in 1991 allegedly to begin the permit process. A great deal of DNR staff time and resources were used to review Noranda's open-pit mine proposal. Citizens were repeatedly assured that all expenses incurred by DNR would be paid for by Noranda.

In 1993 Noranda decided that they would not pursue their project and left the state. Eventually DNR billed Noranda for time and resources spent for the review for an amount in excess of $300,000.

Noranda refused to pay these bills claiming they never applied for a permit to build a mine. Several attempts by DNR lawyers to collect the money were unsuccessful and the case was referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ). While DOJ recently said they have made a decision as to what they will do, there has been no disclosure of these plans.

Some might suggest this information will have to wait until after the elections to avoid more bad press for the Governor. This is another example of how our DNR went full speed ahead to fast track a mine permit even before the company had applied for the permit that would guarantee that the taxpayers' money would be reimbursed.

Throughout the state, the DNR is being forced to provide resource protection with less money.  Those who benefit from these services are increasingly being asked to pay for these services.  For most of us, these fees are obligatory and up front.  For those with power and political influence, reimbursement may be optional.

This also begs the question as to whether the DNR should be wasting time and resources on the Nicolet permit application without confirmation that they can meet the requirements of the Mining Moratorium Law.

Economics of Wastewater Transfer

 The proposed wastewater pipeline from the Crandon Mine would allow the company to avoid local water quality standards by pumping their pollution to a distant community that has no legal recourse.  The polluted wastewater would enter the Wisconsin River one mile north of the Lincoln County line but the DNR determined in advance that Lincoln County is not an "affected municipality." Thompson's DNR denied the receiving county a public hearing even after a formal request from the Lincoln County Board.

Tomahawk, the first city downstream of the pipeline outlet, hired a consultant with funds from the Mining Investment and Local Impact Fund to determine if there would be any impact from the pollution to the municipal Wastewater Treatment Plant (WWTP) or the dominant local industry, a paper mill owned by Tenneco Packaging.

A draft report released in September 1998 confirmed Tomahawk's concerns: "If the above impacts were realized by the City of Tomahawk, the local community could be affected by user-fee increases and/or tax increases to cover the cost of additional effluent monitoring and/or additional water supply treatment. In a worst-case scenario, the community growth may be limited by the WWTP's inability to accept additional industrial discharges containing the specific metals of concern.  This could discourage industries from locating in the City of Tomahawk and result in the loss of potential revenue from the  industry in the form of sewer fees, property taxes, etc., and in the loss of jobs for the community. The potential limitation on expansion for local industry, specifically Tenneco Packaging, would also  result in lost revenue and  lost jobs, again limiting growth of the local community."

Similar restrictions on future community growth and economic development are inherent in any metallic mining project proposal due to the EPA's Total Maximum Daily Load limits on a particular watershed.(9)   Such local economic considerations are not addressed by the DNR in their evaluation of mining decisions.

The following sections of this report discuss key details:

  Report Overview and Introduction
  More Mining Issues
  The Mining Money Trail
  Conclusion and Recommendations
  Methodology and References